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Abstract 
ParentCompany’s decision to close R&DCo in North East England caused the 
loss of highly skilled scientific and technical jobs. R&DCo was a ‘white-collar’ 
R&D operation and supplier of services to ParentCompany’s lead factories in 
the East Midlands and South West regions. The economic and social costs of 
closure were acute for the North East with its relatively weak growth, high 
unemployment and limited R&D activity. The paper argues that a clearer 
understanding and progressive response to such closures may benefit from a 
conceptualisation founded upon spatialised social relations and characterised 
by a social process of production that unfolds over time, across space and in 
place. Periodised in episodic socio-spatial ‘moments’, a historically evolving 
social process of closure reveals differential potential - contingent upon 
specific conjunctures of structural forces, social agency and the particularities 
of places - to enable and/or inhibit intervention through public policy and 
institutional action and political mobilisation and resistance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
ParentCompany… …is closing its long-established R&DCo operation 
in Newcastle and switching the work to Derby. It is not a production 
facility. It does not employ a huge number of people. The company’s 
factories on Tyneside will, we are told, remain. So at one level, the 
departure is not shattering. But for more than 30 years, R&DCo has 
been part of the region’s skills base in the vital area of R&D. Former 
employees have moved on to begin other enterprises in the area. It has 
given the region a much-needed reputation at the cutting edge of 
technological development. Its departure diminishes that reputation. 
The departure is no small thing. Hopefully, the gap it leaves will be 
filled (Editorial, The Journal, 23 February, 1998). 
In February 1998, a power engineering company announced the closure of its 
R&D operation — R&DCo — in North East England. The closure caused the 
loss of 84 highly skilled scientific and technical jobs held mainly by men aged 
in their forties, some with over thirty years service. R&DCo would close in 
June 1998 following statutory consultation with its recognised trade unions. 
R&DCo was a ‘white-collar’ R&D operation and supplier of engineering and 
laboratory services to ParentCompany’s lead factories in the East Midlands 
and South West. Contrary to industry-wide decentralisation of engineering 
and technology functions, ParentCompany sought to reduce costs and 
centrally co-ordinate its R&D activities from the East Midlands. The economic 
and social costs of closure were acute for the North East with its relatively 
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weak growth, high unemployment and limited R&D activity. Gordon Adam, 
Labour MEP, articulated local concerns:  
All evidence shows that economic development is closely linked to 
research capacity. R&DCo have a proud record and profitable record. 
ParentCompany may cut some costs with the closure, its shareholders 
may benefit, but these are short term gains which must be set against 
the considerable long-term loss to the region (quoted in (Brady 1998a): 
5).  
This episode of the closure of a R&D operation in an old industrial region 
raises questions about how to understand closures and why they happen, 
what their implications are and what can be done about them. 
 
As manifestations of the combined and uneven development of the spatially 
constituted evolution of capitalism, closures have been a recurrent concern in 
economic geography, especially during periods of de-industrialisation in 
advanced capitalist states (Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Martin and 
Rowthorn 1986; Fothergill and Guy 1990; Williams, Williams and Haslam 
1990). Individuals, communities, organisations and territories can experience 
the ‘closure’ of a bank branch, community centre, factory, farm, hospital, mine, 
office or shop and its effects — lost jobs, output, income and service provision 
— as direct and indirect challenges to their prosperity and well-being. Social 
solidarity, political outlook, cultural identity and psychological health can be 
affected too. Traditional Marxist approaches interpreted closures as part of 
the everyday workings of the capitalist economy (Harvey 1982). The 
continued prevalence and intensity of closures may have rendered them an 
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even more accepted and inevitable part of economic geographies. Almost 
irrespective of broader business cycles, heightened, even ‘globalised’, capital 
mobility and the increased turnover of capital in time and space has 
intensified its abandonment of host economies: “In the new global context, the 
flexibility of capital means that firms readily disinvest in one locality to seek 
out cost, market and knowledge advantages in another” (Bryson, Henry, 
Keeble and Martin 1999): 12). Many territorial development institutions have 
developed standardised repertoires to deal with closures (Pike 2002), and 
increasingly emphasise regional adaptability and social learning (Wolfe and 
Gertler 2002) in the management of periodic episodes of decline: “the North 
East must recognise that products and services will have a faster turnover 
rate and actively plan for closures and departures” (Chairman, North East 
Regional Development Agency in (Bridge 2000): 5). In contrast to the broader 
and deeper waves in the 1970s and 1980s (Levie, Gregory and Lorentzen 
1984; Hudson and Sadler 1986; Beynon and Hudson 1993), local and 
regional political mobilisation and resistance to closures have become 
spatially differentiated and place-specific with unevenness between cases of 
muted acquiescence and active contest (Hayter and Harvey 1993). 
 
Connecting to the project of renewing Marxian political economy in economic 
geography (Martin 1994; Sayer 1995; Castree 1999; Hudson 2001; Storper 
2001) and given their continued and perhaps increasing importance in 
(re)making the landscapes of contemporary capitalism, it is timely to revisit 
the longstanding tradition and periodic concern with closures. The aim is to 
build a geographical political economy of closure to address questions of 
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understanding and conceptualisation, explanation and causation, implications 
and geographically uneven responses in terms of public policy and institutions 
and political mobilisation and resistance. The argument is that clearer 
understanding and more progressive responses to closures may benefit from 
a conceptualisation founded upon spatialised social relations and 
characterised by a social process of production that unfolds over time, across 
space and in place. Periodised in episodic socio-spatial ‘moments’, a 
historically evolving social process of closure reveals differential potential - 
contingent upon the specific conjunctures of structural forces, social agency 
and the particularities of places - to enable and/or inhibit intervention by public 
institutions and/or collective resistance. The closure of a R&D company in 
North East England is used to explain and demonstrate how this geographical 
political economy approach can contribute to our understanding and address 
the key questions concerning closures. 
 
 
A CRITIQUE OF THE EXISTING LITERATURE ON CLOSURES 
The longstanding literature on the geographical anatomy of economic 
restructuring has increasingly emphasised its path dependent, often 
indeterminant, trajectories including and beyond closure (Massey and 
Meegan 1982; Clark 1990; Massey 1995; Hudson 2001). Closure is significant 
and can be separated analytically from often preceding in-situ decline (cf. 
Massey and Meegan, 1982) because: 
Closure is more final, more dramatic and more painful than merely 
reducing employment levels. A plant, once closed, is unlikely to reopen; 
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a plant with contracting employment levels may subsequently increase 
its labour demands. Second, closure is a clearly distinguished event, 
whereas layoffs may be difficult to discern from the normal turnover of 
labour (Watts and Stafford 1986): 207). 
A longstanding literature has addressed this distinctiveness of closures with 
particular approaches to conceptualisation and explanation (Erickson 1980; 
Fothergill and Guy 1990; Clark and Wrigley 1997; Tomaney, Pike and 
Cornford 1999). Where the focus is broader geographies of economic 
restructuring ‘closure’ is an unproblematic and clearly understood category 
(e.g. Bluestone and Harrison, 1982; Clark, 1990). Other work treats closure as 
a self-explanatory category (e.g. (Healey 1982). It uses a basic definition of 
the cessation of activities at a specific site of production or consumption and 
the finish and shutting of that particular site: “the decision to permanently 
contract, close or relocate a plant” (Howland 1988): 194) and “closure is a 
clearly distinguished event” (Watts and Stafford 1986: 207). Focusing upon 
closures within multi-plant firms, typological analytical frameworks distinguish 
between motivation (problem recognition and plant closure decision because 
of external/internal factors) and selection (particular plant closure decision 
because of internal and local, area-related considerations) and different types 
of closure (cessation, default and selective) (Fothergill and Guy, 1990; Watts 
and Stafford, 1986). 
 
Explanation often distinguishes between ‘internal’ (plant-related) and ‘external’ 
(corporate, industrial, macro-economic, regulatory) causes with explanatory 
weight determined by frequency of mention in surveys and interviews by 
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affected interests (mostly firms) and their categorisation (Healey 1982; 
O'Farrell and Crouchley 1983; Fothergill and Guy 1990; Kirkham and Watts 
1998). The ‘variables’ are ranked and constructed into an explanation (e.g. 
Watts and Stafford, 1986) or used to develop quantitative models (e.g. 
Howland, 1988). Fothergill and Guy’s (1990: 76) ‘chain of causation’ 
recognizes the multiple conjuncture of inter-related explanatory factors and 
groups ‘major’ and ‘minor’ reasons into categories (longer term shifts, 
recession-related, firm-specific and plant-specific) with structural changes in 
demand, recession, import penetration and technological change in product 
and process the most common. 
 
There are several problems with existing approaches to closure. First, the 
conceptualisation of closure as a simply defined and clearly distinguishable 
event is questionable. As Fothergill and Guy (1990: 70) admit: “There really 
isn’t such a thing as an ‘average’ or ‘typical’ closure”. The diversity and 
heterogeneity of particular closure situations mean simple definition and 
typological classification, while offering valuable heuristics, can never be 
totally comprehensive (Clark and Wrigley, 1997: 342). Beneath superficial first 
appearances particular closures in places unfold differentially, blurring neat 
categorisations, potentially encompassing receivership, ownership changes, 
management and/or employee-led ‘buy-outs’, facility ‘mothballing’, 
shareholder dissent and community resistance. Second, empirical analyses 
reveal that specific closures can undergo temporal transformation in their 
particular status, form and character over time in place as they unfold. 
Activities may become more or less likely to close, assets or parts of activities 
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may be sold and/or relocated and initial confrontation may become 
acquiescence. Existing categorisations effectively take a temporal and spatial 
‘snapshot’: “…plant closures… …have been explored over only a very limited 
time-period… …the sensitivity of results to the temporal context of research is 
uncertain” (Kirkham and Watts, 1998: 1563; Clark and Wrigley, 1997: 342).  
 
Third, distinguishing between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ factors tends to 
emphasise the determinant role of structural ‘economic’ explanations for 
closure. Closures involve a wide variety of factors and processes across a 
range of levels that “interact in complex ways depending upon the specific 
situation” (Walker 1992): 56). Despite claims that “just a handful of reasons for 
closure dominate the picture” (Fothergill and Guy, 1990: 78), their inter-
relations in particular cases, the role of social agency and their particular 
socio-institutional and spatial context are often underplayed. Indeed, the 
existing literature sometimes displays a somewhat reductionist, ‘external’ 
rather than integral view of space and place, such as Howland’s (1988:193) 
“local economic conditions” and Kirkham and Watts’ (1998: 1567) “area 
characteristics”. While acknowledging that “to some extent then, each closure 
is unique” (Fothergill and Guy, 1990: 84), existing approaches are weaker on 
the relations of what is necessary and contingent in explaining closures. 
Fourth, existing approaches often fragment and disconnect the explanation of 
closure from its local and regional consequences. Analysis often divides the 
closure process into temporally discrete and separate stages, for example 
‘closure’ and ‘post-closure’ (Noble and Schofield 1993; Hinde 1994), with few 
attempts at integration (Harrison 1986; Tomaney et al. 1999). Fifth, the 
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existing literature retains a relatively narrow focus upon manufacturing, 
particular industrial sectors (e.g. brewing, chemicals, steel), multi-plant firms 
and individual plants (e.g. Kirkham and Watts 1998). Few studies exist of 
services, especially R&D. The geographical focus has been somewhat 
broader, encompassing national, regional and local scales. 
 
Last, existing approaches are weak in addressing the growing spatial 
differentiation and place-specific character of public policy and institutional 
responses and political mobilisation and resistance to closures. Albeit based 
on the limited availability of systematic review, marked unevenness is evident 
between cases of relative acceptance (e.g. Electrolux, North East England; 
Ford Cars, London; Maytag Corporation, Illinois) and resistance (e.g. Levi 
Strauss, Dundee; Oxford University Press, England; Renault Vilvoorde, 
Belgium). Explaining such unevenness connects with geographical political 
economy’s longstanding engagement with the normative and action-oriented 
concerns of praxis and progressive public policy intervention (Bluestone and 
Harrison 1982; Levie et al. 1984; Hudson and Sadler 1986). 
 
 
BUILDING A GEOGRAPHICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CLOSURE 
The limitations of existing approaches suggest the need to “break open the 
black-box termed ‘exit’” (Clark and Wrigley, 1997: 342) to look beyond the 
deceptively simple and superficial conceptualisation and explanation of 
closures. To renew geographical political economy enquiry, Massey 
(1995:104) suggests the need: 
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to conceptualise processes and relations. Objects are not simply given 
to analysis, but are themselves products, and must be conceptualised 
in such a way as to incorporate, not just their descriptive characteristics, 
but also the process of their production, the larger dynamic of which 
they are part. 
This ‘relational’ approach (Massey 1995; Allen, Massey and Cochrane 1998) 
provides a way to address the apparently simple object of a closure and 
conceptualise and explain it as the product of spatialised social relations and 
a social process of production that unfolds over time across space and in 
place. Rather than being treated as something external, space and place are 
incorporated into theorising closures as part of the constant (re)making of the 
economic and social landscape in particular ways by social agents (Harvey 
1982; Herod 2001). The diversity and heterogeneity of specific closures can 
be interpreted as combinations of generalisable necessary relations (e.g. the 
dynamics of capital accumulation, competition, capital ownership, labour-
management relations, state regulation) with causal powers only contingently 
realised at specific times in particular places, remaining empirical questions 
(Sayer 1999; Hudson 2001). The spatialised social relations that tie the 
fortunes of places together may have become stretched, distanciated and 
entangled within broader webs of connection in recent conceptualisation 
(Smith 2004). Yet this elaboration strengthens their analytical value. 
 
Second, conceptualising a historical geography of spatialised social relations 
and social process of closure addresses the temporal transformation of 
closures changing their status, form and character over time, across space 
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and in place. The trajectory of the social process of closure is unavoidably 
shaped by its own historical and geographical evolution such that: “the end 
point of restructuring is path-dependent, thus determined by the interaction 
between actions, events and intentions… …economic imperatives are actually 
historically contingent and spatially heterogeneous” (Clark, 1990: 409). 
Perceptive existing analyses interpreted a “closure process” (Fothergill and 
Guy, 1990: 70) and “…various types of exit…should be understood… …to be 
part of an ongoing process” (Clark and Wrigley, 1997: 346), acknowledging 
that “the announcement of a plant’s closure is not quite the end of the story” 
(Fothergill and Guy, 1990: 132). Economic sociology’s understanding of the 
‘social production of redundancy’ further supports this approach (Lee 1987; 
Turnbull and Wass 1997). The emphasis on process need not entail a shift 
away from explaining the roles and actions of agents nor the obscuring of the 
possibility of or responsibility for change (Markusen 1999). 
 
Harvey (Harvey 1996): 106) understands causal processes and tendencies as 
the contingent realisation of socio-spatial conjunctures — ‘moments’ — in the 
unfolding social process of development of their constitutive social relations. 
An analytical framework can help to think through examples of potential 
‘moments’ (amongst others) and their causation in the social process of 
closure (Table 1). Empirical research can reveal how closures experience 
common and dissimilar ‘moments’, connecting with Clark and Wrigley’s (1997) 
framework:  
…there are many possible temporal sequences through the inter-
related options represented and there is no intention to suggest that all 
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firms, or any firm, will necessarily have to move sequentially through all 
exit options (346)… …Each of the possibilities considered should be 
viewed as having a ‘place’ in time and space… (348). 
This framework too makes no claims to represent an inevitable linear 
sequence, typology, programme of stages or check-list through which each 
and every closure will pass. Instead, it seeks to move beyond a linear 
description of events over time. The approach focuses on those ‘time/spaces’ 
which capture the determining ‘moments’ that explain how things unravelled in 
the way that they did. 
 
 
Table 1: Examples of Potential Moments and Potential Causation in a 
Closure Process Trajectory 
 
Moment Causation 
Origins of decline Declining profitability 
Import penetration 
Market share loss 
Organisational marginalisation 
Technological obsolescence 
Under-investment  
Weak productivity 
Closure proposal 
and decision 
Intra-corporate investment competition 
Increased costs 
Loan foreclosure  
Recession 
Re-location of activities 
Structural demand shifts 
Responses of 
agents 
Collective ‘anti-closure’ campaigns 
Individual and/or collective acceptance and/or resistance 
Industrial action 
Public policy and institutional intervention  
Political lobbying (local, regional, national, international) 
Public demonstrations 
Impact of closure 
 
Employment loss  
Increased social subsidy 
Lost income 
Negative multipliers in local goods and services markets 
Undermined local/regional prosperity 
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Competition 
and/or Conflict 
Alternative rescue plans 
Competing buyers 
Legislative challenges 
Local and parent company management disagreements 
Facility occupation and/or ‘Work-in’ 
Vandalism of products and/or facilities 
Co-operation 
and/or 
Collaboration 
Management, workforce and trade union acceptance or 
collective mobilisation/resistance to closure 
Planned rationalisation 
Redundancy 
Re-training and/or redeployment of workforce 
Sale of business and/or facility  
Voluntary severance 
Dissolution Retraining effort 
Former employee job turnover 
Failure/closure or growth/expansion of rescued 
business(es) 
Demolition and site redevelopment 
Legal challenge settlement 
 
Source: Author’s Research, Fothergill and Guy (1990: 78), Watts and 
Stafford (1986: 221). 
 
 
Third, the geographical political economy approach seeks to qualify rather 
than deny the determinant position structural economic causes are often 
afforded in existing accounts of closure by giving appropriate weight to social 
agency and socio-institutional context in shaping specific outcomes in 
particular places (Clark 1990; Sunley 1996; Storper 2001). As Massey (1995: 
316) argued: 
this does not mean that outcomes are totally indeterminate, in the 
sense that nothing can be anticipated - even in the case of human 
agency the potential courses of action are frequently restricted (people 
are boxed-in, there is only bounded indeterminacy). 
Fothergill and Guy (1990: 132) echo this bounded indeterminacy between the 
two extremes of workforce acceptance and anti-closure campaigns: 
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“announcement of a plant’s closure is not quite the end of the story. Closure is 
not always accepted meekly by the workforce, by the plant management, or 
by the local authorities and regional development agencies.” Particular places 
have specific and contingent influence upon the historical evolution, character 
and form of local social relations and processes (Beynon and Hudson, 1993). 
Fourth, a ‘holistic’ geographical political economy (Beynon, Hudson and 
Sadler 1994; Allen et al. 1998; Perrons 2000) can integrate analysis of the 
temporally discrete passages of the closure episode. Borrowing from 
economic sociology: “instead of studying the redundancy and labour market 
situations of redundant workers separately, attention should be paid to their 
interrelation” (Lee 1987): 5). Fifth, the narrow focus of existing work can be 
broadened by studying an array of different closures — hospitals, military 
bases, mines, bank branches (Korman 1989; Turner and Gregory 1996; Hill 
and Markusen 2000; Marshall 2000) — and broadening the understanding of 
social relations to consider forms of social division (gender, race, identity) and 
social character (social forms of capital, regional political culture) as integral 
parts of geographical political economy rather than after-thoughts to the 
traditional capital-centric concerns of class relations (Beynon and Hudson 
1993; Halford and Savage 1997). 
 
Last, Harvey (1996) explains geographical unevenness in collective action in 
terms of spatialised social relations and a social process of closure. A 
distinction is drawn between potentially conflicting or complementary 
workplace and community politics. Workplace interests of protecting jobs 
shape the form of local social relations and political identity. These can 
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converge with wider and longer term community interests in supportive 
coalitions or diverge to cause division and conflict. Contrary to workplace 
interests in a car factory closure, community politics questioned the 
contribution to their longer term aims of preserving “shit-jobs” in a factory 
producing ecologically unsound, luxury commodities in an industry with acute 
overcapacity under the existing oppressive socio-economic order (Harvey 
1996: 22). Particular local articulations between workplace and community 
politics shape the extent and character of localised responses to closures. 
Harvey (1996) revisits territory and class as bases for social and political 
organisation by drawing upon Raymond Williams’ ‘militant particularism’; that 
is the way: “ideals forged out of the affirmative experience of solidarities in 
one place get generalized and universalized as a working model of a new 
form of society that will benefit all humanity” (Harvey, 1996: 32). In closure 
situations attachments forged by localised social relations are not 
unproblematically generalised if: “a concern with a more general class 
solidarity is subordinated to a more immediate concern with work and life in a 
localised and spatially delimited community” (Hudson 2000): 206). Under 
capitalism, this can generate inter-territorial competition between cross-class 
alliances to defend jobs for ‘their’ people in ‘their’ community (Hudson and 
Sadler, 1986). Particular local articulations of workplace and community 
politics and militant particularisms are contingent but may range from strong 
class identities, rooted in traditional industries, contesting closures and 
demanding state intervention to consistent failures in resisting closures 
breeding acceptance and disillusionment with politics and public intervention 
(Beynon and Hudson, 1993). Critical for praxis is the understanding of closure 
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as constituted by a wider web of social relations and unfolding through a 
social process – marked by ‘moments’ – that could open up space for 
collective action to shape the extent and nature of the closure trajectory. 
Particular ‘moments’ may provide opportunities for leverage and decisive 
intervention to influence the closure process. 
 
Massey’s (Massey 1995): 316) ‘bounded indeterminacy’ claims that “in 
principle outcomes need specific investigation” and the geographical political 
economy of closure requires empirical analysis of the relations between 
agents, structures and places “allied with a sense of the definite limits to 
social action” rather than empiricism, voluntarism or structuralist determinism 
(Beynon and Hudson, 1993: 187). R&DCo’s closure in North East England is 
analysed to illuminate the central argument concerning the clearer 
understanding and potential for progressive responses by conceptualising and 
explaining closures in terms of spatialised social relations and a social 
process of production that unfolds over time, across space and in place. 
Macro-level data on closures at the EU and national levels is limited. Many 
aggregate studies rely on press reports of ‘closures’ and are unable clearly to 
distinguish between rationalisation, job loss and outright closure (e.g. (Watts 
2001). R&DCo is the case study because it was a ‘white-collar’ R&D services 
operation, employed 84 highly skilled scientists and technicians and was 
strategically important to the regional economy. The intensive research 
method comprised: i) in-depth, semi-structured interviews with the 
management, trade unions and workforce; ii) analysis of published and 
unpublished secondary materials (e.g. press reports, reports and accounts); 
C:\Documents and Settings\nlmm3\Desktop\revised-theory.doc 17 
and, iii) participant observation leading action-research projects for the trade 
unions in R&DCo and ParentCompany (Pike 1998).  
 
 
THE CLOSURE OF R&DCO IN NORTH EAST ENGLAND 
To broaden its focus and maintain its technological leadership, Tyneside-
based engineering group Parsons established R&DCo independently in 1962, 
consolidating its Nuclear Research Centre and other group R&D activities. It 
employed over 350. In late 1950s Newcastle, Parsons claimed to: 
…make Heaton a major centre of peaceful nuclear research and bring 
more work to the North East with greater safeguards 
against… …possible recession… …The proposed laboratories and 
their equipment would… …be amongst the finest in the country and 
Tyneside could be justly proud of them… [providing] an unrivalled link 
between the Universities and Technical Colleges in the North East 
(Submission for Planning Permission, Parsons Group cited in (Wright 
1996): 2). 
R&DCo emerged amidst the technological ‘White Heat’ of then Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson’s modernisation strategy for the British economy. Internally, 
“the range of expertise available from R&DCo’s engineers, scientists and 
other skilled workers made the company one of the foremost establishments 
of its kind, certainly in the North East of England, if not the whole country” 
(Wright, 1996: 72). 
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SPATIALISED SOCIAL RELATIONS IN NORTH EAST ENGLAND AND 
PARENT COMPANY 
The geographical political economy of closure’s emphasis upon the particular 
character of spatialised social relations and their constitution as part of an 
unfolding social process emphasises the particular context of the North East’s 
historical evolution of social relations and the specific history of changing 
social relations of ownership and control of R&DCo within ParentCompany. 
The North East’s 19th Century growth of ‘carboniferous capitalism’ shaped the 
particular character of regional social relations through, sometimes 
paternalistic, industrial pioneers and moderate, often accommodative, trade 
unionism (Austrin and Beynon 1997). Long-run decline of its industrial base 
created a ‘state-managed’ (Hudson 1989) ‘branch plant economy’, 
economically weak and politically peripheral, with an increasingly service-
oriented economic base, characterised by external control and limited 
strategic functions such as headquarters and R&D (Pike, 1999). Recurrent 
rationalisation and closure have punctuated this dependent industrialisation, 
including Fujitsu and Siemens’ demise in the 1990s (Dawley 2003), creating 
relatively high redundancy rates.  
 
Historically, traditional industry closures mobilised local political resistance 
(NorthTynesideTradesCouncil 1979; Hudson and Sadler 1986). Such 
collective action has largely waned, bar some limited localised cases, amid a 
sense of inevitability and politics of post-industrial modernisation (Robinson 
2002). The depth and chronic nature of de-industrialisation have underpinned 
a neo-corporatist consensus around institutions of adaptation. Closures have 
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become accepted symptoms of volatile ‘globalised’ investment flows with a 
standardised institutional response (Pike, 2002). Social relations in the North 
East have been dominated by the politics of the workplace, supported by an 
allied and supportive community politics, and its militant particularism has 
been largely accommodative to the needs of capital and national and regional 
state modernisation strategies.  
 
R&DCo and ParentCompany share hallmarks of the North East’s industrial 
legacy. Consolidation of regional engineering companies meant constant 
ownership changes for R&DCo with few long-term benefits. Joint ownership 
by Vickers and Reyrolle Parsons in 1974 preceded merger with Clarke 
Chapman to form Northern Engineering Industries (NEI) in 1977. By 1979, 
NEI repurchased Vickers’ share in R&DCo and maintained a ‘critical mass’ in 
its North East ‘home base’ exchanging labour for cyclical market downturns, 
capacity subcontracting and sharing R&D and training (Pike, 2001). In 1989, 
NEI’s merger with ParentCompany externalised ownership beyond Tyneside 
and raised shareholder concerns about under-valuation and its Northern 
identity. One accused the then Chairman of ‘selling the company down the 
river’ (Simpson 1989). NEI pledged to retain its constituent businesses, trade  
names, and Newcastle headquarters with no redundancies. In a precursor of 
future fragmentation, R&DCo lost its R&M and waste management units. 
Some claimed: “R&DCo became a small appendage to ParentCompany” 
(Norman Searle, Former Departmental Head, in Wright, 1996: iii). 
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Historically, ParentCompany has forged close relations to the British state and 
finance capital in The City of London as a ‘Blue Chip’, leading member of ‘UK 
Plc’ and bellwether of British manufacturing technological leadership. It has a 
London headquarters and array of international manufacturing and service 
operations. In the late 1990s, intense competition led ParentCompany to 
focus and internationalise its core business of industrial power systems, 
particularly in civil and defence aerospace markets. A matrix structure of 
‘customer facing business units’ supported by operating units and functions 
(including engineering and technology) was established to enhance customer, 
product and operations focus, quicken decision-making, devolve 
accountability, and enhance flexibility and responsiveness (ParentCompany 
1998a). Despite claims of ‘globalisation’ and significant manufacturing 
contracting-out, ParentCompany remained highly embedded in its British 
‘home base’, accounting for over 75% of employment and turnover and nearly 
66% of net assets in the late 1990s (Pike, 2001). The particular character of 
spatialised social relations in the North East and the historical legacy of 
repeated changes in the social relations of ownership and control combined to 
shape the initial moments of marginalisation of R&DCo within 
ParentCompany’s new corporate organisation and strategy. 
 
 
MOMENTS IN THE UNFOLDING SOCIAL PROCESS OF CLOSURE OF 
R&DCo 
The geographical political economy of closure seeks to reveal the underlying 
social relations and social processes involved rather than treating closure as a 
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discrete event. The origins of R&DCo’s closure were historically entrenched 
tendencies shaped by its particular embeddedness in the North East and its 
relations with ParentCompany, comprising strategic and organisational 
marginalisation, under-investment, fragmentation and the selective 
incorporation of specific activities. R&DCo’s changing ownership history 
meant unstable development and local roots erosion: “the original identity of 
R&DCo was lost, the old company logo dispensed with and there was a 
general impression that NEI did not really know what to do about R&DCo” 
(Norman Searle, Former Departmental Head, in Wright, 1996: iii). R&DCo’s 
lack of a role was reinforced by a legacy of relative under-investment. 
ParentCompany’s pursued ‘shareholder value’ through short-term revenue 
and profitability growth (Williams 2000) and under-invested in R&D despite 
increasing sales revenues (5.7% of turnover (£206m) compared to 10% 
amongst its main rivals ABB, SNECMA and Siemens in 1996) (Pike, 1998). 
From the 1960s, R&DCo pioneered the outsourced and fragmented model of 
internal and external contract R&D (Whittington 1992). Amid intensified 
external competition, R&DCo had to generate and/or raise capital and meet 
return on investment targets while ParentCompany under-invested in R&D. 
R&DCo displayed elements of technological leadership, generating some 
spin-off companies and licensing agreements, but its culture was research not 
manufacture. Its commercialisation record was relatively weak, hampered by 
inefficient costing and relatively high overhead costs. 
 
Following a fire at R&DCo’s premises and a public campaign in 1994 (Pike 
and Tomaney 1994), ParentCompany budgeted £3m for a ‘new’, smaller 
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R&DCo with a reduced range of activities on a new site nearby. 
ParentCompany management replaced local R&DCo management, enforcing 
a pay freeze, test tower closure and cessation of the metal spraying and 
optical filters activities (Wright, 1996). Challenging (Checkland 1975)’s ‘Upas 
Tree’ thesis, the latter team established a profitable spin-off company in 
Tyneside. ParentCompany allegedly collected a £12m insurance payment and 
£400,000 from Newcastle City Council to retain R&DCo in the city. 
ParentCompany’s new Advanced Engineering Centre (AEC) was established 
outside R&DCo. 
 
From a peak of over 350 in 1967, R&DCo’s employment collapsed from 225 
in 1993 to 84 in 1998, fuelling rumours regarding its viability. R&DCo was 
reorganised into disciplinary teams embracing core markets for aeroengine 
and marine propulsion factories in Derby and Bristol and external contractors 
(materials testing and instrumentation, coatings and joining and electro-
mechanical systems including the stress analysis team). As highly qualified 
‘knowledge workers’ (8 PhDs, 25 BScs and 20 HNCs with 21 years average 
service) with a predominantly masculine employment culture, R&DCo’s 
different engineering disciplines worked together ‘under one roof’ in one place, 
increasing technological spill-over potential and the exchange and utilisation 
of tacit knowledge. By 1997, R&DCo was trading profitably within 
ParentCompany. A specific social process of closure shaped by the particular 
articulation of social relations and R&DCo’s characteristics conditioned its 
evolutionary trajectory and fostered many of the conditions that precipitated its 
eventual closure. The geographical political economy approach reveals the 
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particular transformations over time in the status, form and character of 
R&DCo’s closure. 
 
Clark and Wrigley’s (1997: 343) claim that: “In unpacking the concept of exit, 
there is a clear need to deal explicitly with the incremental and sequential 
nature of corporate decision-making” connects directly with the geographical 
political economy approach to the unfolding social process of closure — 
characterised by episodic socio-spatial ‘moments’ — marked by specific 
conjunctures of structural forces, social agency and the particularities of 
places. ParentCompany’s strategy to establish defensible technological 
leadership in industrial power systems consolidated the group engineering 
and technology function, directed from a single site in Derby (East Midlands), 
to develop close links to new business and operational unit needs, explore 
medium and long-term business development, strengthen group technology 
development and exploitation and improve group technology base access 
(ParentCompany 1998a). The social relations of ownership and control 
exercised social power through ParentCompany in proposing R&DCo’s 
closure as it sought to relocate the core electrical machines and stress 
analysis teams and AEC to Derby. ParentCompany sought technology group 
integration and development, recruitment and career development, 
communication and integration with internal customers, accelerated group 
technology dissemination and adjacent location to related technology teams 
and support facilities (ParentCompany, 1998a: 4).  
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On 18 February 1998, the formal closure proposal was announced. R&DCo’s 
activities were described as contract engineering and testing work, primarily 
for internal customers based in Derby, that was not considered viable on a 
“small, independent site” due to :  
i) business risk – the order book horizon is short and the nature of the 
work, overflow from other groups, means that R&DCo is exposed to 
significant work load uncertainties of its customers in the medium to 
long term; ii) overhead – the sites costs and management overheads of 
a small independent site are a significant burden when compared to 
the cost of integrating these activities with existing groups on larger 
customer sites (ParentCompany 1998b): 4-5). 
ParentCompany announced a ‘comprehensive programme’ of intra-group 
outplacement or redundancy support. Rather than any single or easily 
identifiable determining event or factor, the closure proposal was shaped by 
social relations and social power and the conjunction of particular historically 
developed tendencies at R&DCo. The proposal was cast in corporate terms 
that constrained R&DCo local management, trade unions and regional 
institutions’ scope to contest and respond. 
 
 
WORKPLACE AND COMMUNITY POLITICS AND MILITANT 
PARTICULARISM IN THE SOCIAL AGENCY OF THE WORKFORCE AND 
REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
The particular configuration of social relations and the unfolding of the specific 
social process of closure of R&DCo revealed differential potential that both 
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enabled and inhibited possibilities for social agency and collective mobilisation 
by the workforce, trade unions, community and local and regional institutions. 
Echoing the moderate traditions and workplace dominated politics of regional 
trade unionism, R&DCo’s Joint Union Committee (JUC) had a long history of 
joint working with management. The JUC’s response to closure sought 
clarification, challenged the proposal and lack of consultation, pursued 
workforce redundancy and closure payments, represented transferred 
members and mobilised community politics for a political and press anti-
closure campaign and alternative strategy, lobbying public representatives 
(Ministers, MPs and MEPs) and the ParentCompany board. 
 
The anti-closure report highlighted the ‘headless economy’ created by the loss 
of strategic R&D activities and jobs not easily replaced by recent call centre 
and assembly-oriented inward investment (Pike, 1998). R&DCo appeared 
profitable, growing, able to cover its overheads and could be integrated into 
ParentCompany’s decentralised engineering and technology structures to tap 
into geographically dispersed centres of expertise. The costs of closure 
comprised £3m from R&DCo’s 1994 relocation, penalties for current contract 
delays and loss of goodwill with strategic customers, redundancy and closure 
payments, relocation and equipment removal expenses. Alternatives 
comprised finding a buyer and attracting public support to re-integrate 
discarded fragments into the regional engineering research and technology 
base. ParentCompany remained unresponsive. Its ‘proposal’ hardened into a 
‘decision’ until the stress analysis team’s decisive social agency and refusal to 
relocate. Rather than an expression of labour solidarity, ParentCompany’s 
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rationale for closing R&DCo was being undermined by the collective sum of 
individual decisions amongst a key section of the workforce to remain in the 
region and reject an enhanced salary (up to 15% higher) with temporary terms. 
ParentCompany’s initial stance then softened: “We are continuing with the 
policy of relocating core technologies within R&DCo to Derby but... …we hope 
to redeploy some of our specialist engineers within the North East” 
(ParentCompany spokesperson quoted in (Cameron and Brady 1998): 1). The 
unorganised AEC staff either agreed to transfer or found jobs elsewhere. 
 
Despite low levels of business R&D in the North East — 0.86% of regional 
GDP (1.34% nationally) and 0.48% of the regional labour force (0.67% 
nationally) in 1995 (CSO 1997) — and R&DCo’s perilous situation, the social 
agency of regional institutions was constrained. A coherent response failed 
immediately to emerge due to R&DCo’s small size relative to larger existing 
and externally-owned regional R&D operations (Northumbria Water, Procter 
and Gamble), the inward investment agency’s confidence in attracting further 
R&D activity and other technology development initiatives. Government Office 
North East (GONE) Director commented: “The R&DCo news is bad news but 
there are other things that we need to explore, and the emphasis should be 
on innovation” (quoted in (Cameron 1998b): 5). Labour MEP Alan Donnelly 
eventually convened senior officials from GONE, Northern Development 
Company and Tyneside TEC behind closed doors to address R&DCo’s plight. 
Their institutionalised politics and collective diagnosis — a private decision by 
a private company — aligned with the prevailing political-economic order and 
conditioned their agency and ability to shape events at this ‘moment’ of 
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potential intervention. A ‘business case’ with public funding was put to 
ParentCompany’s board to retain at least some jobs at their existing 
operations in the region, supported by trade unions and the press:  
But beyond the importance of this valuable facility to individual staff is 
its immense significance to a region which already suffers from a 
shortage of key R&D facilities. If the North’s economy is to flourish in 
the long term, its growth must be underpinned by the technical know-
how and innovation provided by units like R&DCo. The region can ill-
afford to lose such facilities: keeping hold of even a faction of their 
expertise will at least provide some foundation for a recovery in the 
future (Editorial, The Journal, Monday 30 March 1998: 10). 
ParentCompany made no application for assistance. Local councillors 
accused it of reneging on its deal with Newcastle City Council to re-establish 
R&DCo (Cameron and Brady 1998). Social process involves “disruption, 
change and conflict as such the outcome is always uncertain” (Massey, 1995: 
311) and contains no linear or programmatic set of stages as agents adjust 
their aspirations, intentions and action in the light of events. The particular 
social agency and pragmatic militant particularism of a section of the 
workforce and local and regional state institutions mediated the structural 
economic imperatives articulated by ParentCompany in their decision to close 
R&DCo. 
 
Geographical political economy’s linkage of explanation to analysis of 
implications revealed how closure triggered the break-up of a technical 
workforce and the splintering of its collective assets in organisational and 
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geographical terms (Table 2). Efforts to salvage jobs for the region were 
limited. Fifty one (61%) secured employment through relocation and transfer 
within ParentCompany: 29 (35%) in the North East, 20 (24%) in the East 
Midlands and 2 (2%) in the South West. Amidst claims that their relocation 
was never finalised, ParentCompany had to accept the stress analysis team’s 
refusal to move to Derby and relocated all 13 staff to a nearby 
ParentCompany aerospace plant in Sunderland with enhanced salaries but 
temporary contracts. Four other members of the electrical machines team 
accepted similar temporary contracts and moved to Derby while the remaining 
3 work away in Derby from the North East. Thirty two (38%) were made 
redundant, including the welding and instrumentation teams. The relative 
dearth of venture capital and R&D activities in the region, combined with asset 
stripping and ParentCompany restrictions on equipment re-use, undermined 
potential spin-offs. Bodycote purchased the R&DCo site, safeguarding 11 
materials testing jobs but without trade union recognition.  
 
 
Table 2 Former R&DCo and AEC Employees by Destination and Status, 
1998 
 
Number Destination and Status 
32 Redundant. Unknown destination. 
13 Electrical Machines/Stress Analysis Team 
relocated to ParentCompany aerospace factory, 
Sunderland. 
11 Advanced Engineering Centre relocated to new 
Engineering and Technology Centre, Derby. 
11 Materials Team, including machine shop and 
materials testing, acquired by Bodycote on former 
R&DCo site. 
7 Electrical Machines Team relocation to 
ParentCompany factory, Derby. 5 on 1 year 
contracts, 2 on permanent contracts. 
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3 Relocation to ParentCompany factory, Hebburn, 
South Tyneside. 
2 Relocation to ParentCompany factory, Derby, East 
Midlands. 
2  Relocation to ParentCompany factory, Bristol, 
South West region. 
2 Relocation to ParentCompany factory, Gateshead, 
Tyne and Wear. 
1 Former AEC employee moved jobs to wind turbine 
connector company. 
Total 84  
 
Source: Author’s research. 
 
 
The final ‘moments’ of R&DCo’s closure unfolded as a slow dissolution 
outwith the public realm. The community politics of former employees, the 
social agency of affected groups and the contingency of local context shaped 
the JUC’s actions, particularly ParentCompany’s local history of undermining 
pension rights in a forging operation closure in Newcastle. The JUC 
negotiated enhanced redundancy settlements and closure payments but their 
Industrial Tribunal claim for a protective award failed following a pre-emptive 
settlement. The rising cost of closing R&DCo — estimated at £400,000 — led 
to the departure of several senior managers and ParentCompany board level 
recriminations regarding the handling of the closure. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
After 36 years, R&DCo finally closed on 12 June 1998. This empirical case 
has been analysed with the aim of building a geographical political economy 
approach to closure by addressing the issues of understanding and 
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conceptualisation, explanation and causation, implications and geographically 
uneven responses. The approach has built upon the critique of existing 
approaches by conceptualising closures as constituted by spatialised social 
relations and characterised by a social process of production that unfolds over 
time, across space and in place. The historically evolving social process of 
closure — marked by particular socio-spatial ‘moments’ — reveals how 
spaces may open up, contingent upon the specific conjunctures of structural 
forces, social agency and the particularities of places, to support and/or hinder 
the potential for intervention by public institutions and/or mobilised coalitions 
of resistance. 
 
The conceptualisation of spatialised social relations illustrated: the particular 
historically constructed character of social relations in North East England; the 
structuring role of the social relations of ownership and control exercised 
through a corporate entity over time, across space and in place; and, the 
‘bounded indeterminacy’ between spatialised social relations and the 
contingent nature of their specific manifestations in particular times and 
places. This understanding shaped the explanation of causation in the 
analysis of R&DCo’s demise in general terms (e.g. changing ownership 
structures, authority and social power to decide upon and enact closure, 
British capitalism’s short-term focus on ‘shareholder value’ and under-
investment in R&D, spatial interdependencies in corporate geographies) and 
in specific articulations particular to corporate context (e.g. refocused 
corporate strategy, centralisation of engineering and technology), social 
agency (e.g. elements of the existing workforce’s regional embeddedness and 
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unwillingness to relocate) and time and place (e.g. North East’s history of 
accommodative and moderate trade unionism, weak levels of R&D 
investment and employment). This analysis demonstrates the conceptual, 
analytical and explanatory value of placing social relations, social power and 
social agency at the heart of geographical political economy. 
 
The social process of production of closure integrated temporal evolution 
across space and in place with the specific conjunctures of structural forces, 
social agency and the particularities of places into the analysis of causation 
and implications. Transformations in the status, form and character of 
R&DCo’s experience of closure were periodised in particular socio-spatial 
‘moments’ comprising: the evolution of historically entrenched legacies 
shaped by its relations with ParentCompany; the discursive construction and 
contestation of the closure ‘proposal’; the workforce and community politics, 
militant particularism and constrained social agency of the trade unions and 
local and regional state institutions; the splintering of the workforce; and, the 
slow dissolution. Although these moments were unique to R&DCo’s 
experience, the analytical framework of unfolding concrete events that 
integrates historical evolution across space and in place is generalisable. This 
approach can interpret how other closures may experience both common and 
different socio-spatial conjunctures and trajectories. 
 
The geographical unevenness of responses to closure was understood as the 
specific articulations between wider webs of spatialised social relations and 
particular circumstances. The geographical political economy approach 
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explained the spatial differentiation of responses to closure by using 
generalised concepts (e.g. workforce and community politics, militant 
particularisms) to analyse the specific characteristics rooted in particular 
places (e.g. alignment of limited elements of workplace and community 
politics to contest the closure, moderate traditions of militant particularism) 
and the differential potential for social agency and collective action across and 
between moments unfolding in the particular social process of R&DCo’s 
closure (e.g. the stress analysis team’s refusal to relocate to Derby, the 
narrow diagnosis and constrained response of regional institutions, corporate 
adaptation of initial proposals). Thinking through spatialised social relations 
and an unfolding social process reveal how spaces of collective action may 
open up and/or contract during a closure. 
 
One of the greatest challenges in formulating Yorkshire’s regional 
policy is to see whether the coalfield can close in a different way from 
the way in which coalfields closed in Yorkshire and throughout the 
country in the 1980s and 1990s (John Grogan, Labour MP, Selby, 
Hansard, Col. 35WH, 7 January, 2003; Author’s emphasis). 
Building a geographical political economy of closure demands a political and 
policy response. What should, can or might be done about closures? 
Interpreting the bounded indeterminacy of closures as constituted by 
spatialised social relations and characterised by an unfolding social process 
marked by moments with differential potential for intervention and collective 
action connects with praxis. Opportunities may emerge to render the closure 
process open to social agency by individuals, collectives and organisations — 
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workforces, trade unions, local management, local, regional and national state 
institutions, civil society, communities — to attempt to shape the unfolding 
process to produce particular outcomes. As R&DCo’s experience revealed, 
closure proposals and decisions do not set in train inevitable, predetermined 
processions of events. The structural imperatives and social power of 
globalising forms of capitalism are enacted and mediated through social 
relations and socio-institutional formations over time, across space and in 
place. This is not to imply that closures can easily be stopped nor transformed 
into unqualified positive outcomes within the geographical political economy of 
contemporary capitalism — indeterminacy is bounded. However, history 
suggests the narrow repertoire of political tactics and social practices used by 
anti-closure campaigns during the 1970s and 1980s were consistent failures 
but revealed: “evidence that workers, their families and communities were not 
passively accepting the negative local impacts of corporate and state 
strategies” (Beynon and Hudson, 1993: 178).  
 
The geographical political economy approach opens up a range of 
possibilities for responses to closures. There is more than one ‘moment’ and 
possible agency through which to intervene in a closure process. These may 
include challenging corporate authority (e.g. through shareholder activism 
against short-termism and under-investment); prompting and supporting 
public debate and a more accountable politics of economic development able 
to question why closures are happening and consider alternative strategies; 
and, developing innovative public interventions to salvage the fragments and 
reintegrate discarded assets back into regional economies as part of building 
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institutional capacity to deal with increased cases of closures. Closures 
remain hugely costly to capital, including direct and indirect financial costs, 
disruption and absorption of managerial effort, adverse publicity, emotional 
costs, damage to managerial careers and potential irreversibility (Clark and 
Wrigley, 1997). Applying leverage to critical moments in the closure process 
may offer some possibilities to ameliorate and/or challenge potentially 
damaging effects through a politics based upon progressive collective action 
and social agency. 
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